The responsibility to protect human rights and the RtoP: prospective and retrospective responsibility

This article argues that -- contrary to the way that it is often framed -- the first pillar of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) is not best understood as an instantiation of a broader international responsibility to protect human rights. Firstly, the RtoP reverts to a discourse of powerful savours and passive victims, which runs against advocates' claim that the RtoP is a 'rights-based norm'. Secondly, although it distinguishes between prevention and response, the RtoP is still fundamentally a discussion of retrospective responsibility. The responsibility to protect human rights, by contrast, is importantly prospective. The article's separation of prospective/retrospective responsibility from the responsibility to prevent and to respond is an independent contribution, with broader significance beyond the RtoP context. Thirdly, the RtoP becomes activated when atrocity is building, imminent or underway; whereas the responsibility to protect human rights may be breached even without a clear causal link to harm

[Review] Andrea Sangiovanni (2017) Humanity without dignity: moral equality, respect, and human rights

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What is the responsibility to respect human rights? Reconsidering the 'respect, protect, and fulfill' framework

The world’s understanding of the action needed to advance human rights is deeply structured by the ‘respect, protect, and fulfill’ framework. But its potential is significantly undermined by a narrow conception of ‘respect’ for human rights. This paper systematically addresses these weaknesses and advances an original alternative. It first provides a historical account of the ‘do no harm’ conception of ‘respect’ in the political context of the late Cold War. It then analyzes this conception’s empirical functioning today, using the example of unauthorized migration along the US–Mexico border. These points illustrate an overarching theoretical argument: the responsibility to respect human rights should be based on a responsibility not to dehumanize, rather than exclusively on a duty to do no harm. This involves the consideration of each person as a moral equal, the elevation of human rights practice as a basis for judgment inside of a moral agent’s self, and the rejection of state-centrism as the basis for all political responsibility. This argument has implications traversing the theory and practice of human rights, including: the ability to translate and embed into practice the new meanings of ‘respect,’ ‘protect,’ and ‘fulfill’; and the need to re-consider the contemporary significance of 1980s liberalism

Humanity Without Dignity: Moral Equality, Respect, and Human Rights

This book aims to reject theoretical approaches that ground human rights in a notion of dignity, understood in terms of an equal rank, transcendental/spiritual quality and/or human capacity for rational agency. It argues instead that the idea of human rights should be grounded in a fundamental moral right of each person not to be treated as inferior. It defends this argument with reference to a substantive account of what it means to be treated as inferior in the relevant sense—dehumanization, instrumentalization, infantilization, objectification and stigmatization—combined with an account of when and why these are wrong. The book says that they are wrong: if and because they are cruel; if and because these forms of treatment affect a person’s capacity to present and to define themselves, as themselves, within a social community; and if and because they occur without meaningful consent. The book applies these ideas to non-discrimination rights; claims that the ideas provide people and states with reasons to create and to maintain an international human rights system; and argues the moral rights explored in the book are “fundamental” (which Sangiovanni defines in a way that is marginally different from Shue’s (1996) definition of “basic” rights: rights that are structurally necessary for other rights)

Diversity and Donations: The Effect of Religious and Ethnic Diversity on Charitable Giving

We explore the effects of local ethnic and religious diversity on individual donations to private charities. Using 10-year neighborhood-level panels derived from personal tax records in Canada, we find that diversity has a detrimental effect on charitable donations. A 10 percentage point increase in ethnic diversity reduces donations by 14%, and a 10 percentage point increase in religious diversity reduces donations by 10%. The ethnic diversity effect is driven by a within-group disposition among non-minorities, and is most evident in high income, but low education areas. The religious diversity effect is driven by a within-group disposition among Catholics, and is concentrated in high income and high education areas. Despite these large effects on amount donated, we find no evidence that increasing diversity affects the fraction of households that donate. Over the period studied, ethnic diversity rises by 6 percentage points and religious diversity rises by 4 percentage points; our results suggest that charities receive about 12% less in total donations. As areas like North America continue to grow more diverse over time, our results imply that these demographic changes may have significant implications for the charitable sector.